Saturday, September 11, 2010

Obama, rethink your Iraq policy

In the coming years, US invasion and occupation, or if you prefer administration, of Iraq will be used as a peculiar case study of Western presence in the Middle East. The focus of such study will not be on the US policies during its troops’ actual presence on the ground, nor will it be on the policies surrounding its massive and sudden withdrawal seven years later. It will focus on the US post-withdrawal policies in resolving Iraq’s political logjam.

First, there is Obama’s letter to Grand Ayatollah Al-Sistani beseeching an intercession based on his role in diffusing previous political tensions in Iraq. But what the administration chose to ignore is Al-Sistani’s advice to Bremer during the Sadrist uprising in 2004, “Mr. Bremer, you are American. I am Iranian. I suggest we leave it to Iraqis to devise their constitution.” Then, there is also the US administration carefully planned schemes for equitable resolution of the gridlock by creating ad hoc political power-sharing body with some executive powers. With some American officials asserting their neutrality regarding who forms or runs the Iraqi government, while others explicitly stating their disfavor of having the Sadrist movement as a part of the coalition government, the scales will clearly tip in favor of the US undeterred pursuit of its interests in the region.

It is this particular resolution that highlights a clear strategic move at undermining Iraq’s external as well as internal sovereignty. If the administration prefers a certain sectarian arrangement within the Iraqi new government, it may enrage excluded groups and force them to take their rage onto the streets threatening further domestic destabilization. Externally, establishing an Iraqi government favorable to the US will strain Iraq’s relationship with its regional neighbors whose support it will be in dire need of in the future.

Politics aside, and more on a tactical note, this intervention is not only micro, but it is also irresponsible and untimely. Assenting to measures that supersede the Iraqi Constitution sets a precarious precedence. In a multi-ethnic, multi-sectarian state such as Iraq upholding ad hoc solutions at the first sectarian disagreement diminishes the sanctity of the Iraqi Constitution, itself drafted under the auspices of the US. Furthermore, in order to pass the legislation establishing this new political body, the Iraqi parliament needs to be called to duty and doing so, in the absence of a new national government six months after elections, is placing the cart before the horse.

Arguing all the above is not to disregard the influence Al-Sistani can render in expediting talks nor is it to dismiss the US obligation to fix its mess given the negotiating capabilities it possesses. It is to highlight the fine line that separates political mediation and political meddling. Obama’s administration gives US interests primacy, and that is rational, but let’s not forget it is also consequential. Enough harm has been done in Iraq. Now, it is time to seek Iraqi solutions to Iraqi problems.


JE

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