Walking and Chewing Gum in Sudan

Ever since the Obama administration declared its policy in Sudan, the President has come under a barrage of attacks from all directions—activists,NGOs, analysts, newspaper columnists—for being too soft on the Sudanese regime, for turning his back on a crisis in the making, for having an “open hand” policy that is “incoherent, contradictory and failing.” Dissatisfaction rests not only upon the policy’s enhanced set of incentives, but also with the absence of a stricter set of disincentives— additional sanctions which these opponents are all too anxious to have the President impose. It is unclear though where the logic of such an argument lies. This is a parochial outlook by myopic observers who chose either to overlook or, perhaps, blindly follow the former American policy on the Sudan, while ignoring the potential humanitarian and strategic gains of the current one.

Ambassador Susan Rice and others who object to Obama's Sudan strategy must review its past record. In 1993, the State Department designated Sudan as a state sponsor of terrorism for harboring international terrorists, including Osama bin Laden, who lived in the capital, Khartoum, since 1991. However, under regional and international pressure, including that of the United States, Sudan extradited Carlos the Jackal in 1994 and expelled bin Laden in 1996. For those actions, Sudan was not rewarded by the United States.

In fact, it was punished. In 1997, the US imposed crippling economic sanctions against Sudan which are still in effect today. Additionally, the Clinton administration bombed the capital in 1998, targeting a pharmaceutical factory that allegedly supplied Al-Qaeda operatives with chemicals used in attacks launched against American embassies in the horn of Africa. Following the strike, Sudan signed the International Convention for the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism and ratified the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing in 1999 and 2000 respectively. Yet again, Sudan was not rewarded by the United States, although these counterterrorism steps were recognized by the UN Security Council, which lifted terrorism-related sanctions against Sudan in 2001. Paradoxically, the Bush administration dismissed such efforts and upheld the US sanctions. Not until 2004 did the State Department remove Sudan from the list of countries that did not fully cooperate with the U.S. antiterrorism efforts despite continuing counterterrorism efforts by Sudan with respect to neighboring African and Arabic countries.

Punitive measures are often justified—by pressuring the central government in Khartoum to settle its differences with the regions on its periphery, mass killings may stop. But there is an absence of carrots in the whole equation. Obama need not guarantee re-establishment of diplomatic relations, nor promise a whole new package of economic stimulation for the Sudan. Mere revision of previously enforced sanctions, or their complete removal, can be satisfactory for a country that has gone through two protracted civil wars and a major famine since its independence in 1956. The US has revised sanctions before, in 2006, when an exemption clause provided relief to marginalized regions within Sudan. Why not to give another pat on the back to a regime that has demonstrated resilience and withstood a multitude of blows to the head?

It is indisputable that Bashir’s regime will partially overcome the economic sanctions with its oil windfalls. But further attempts to strangle the regime with sanctions will only affect the poorest section of the society, and widen the ever-growing gap between the elites and the rest of the Sudanese.Reports on the sufferings in the west Darfur and south are multitude. Sudanese in the center and the north suffer similarly. Needless to say, poverty and underdevelopment are at the heart of Sudan's conflicts in the south and in Darfur. The Sudanese private sector—in agriculture, manufacturing and services—is already overwhelmed by its efforts to live with American-inspired sanctions. To impose additional ones is tantamount to passing a death sentence on this vehicle of economic advancement and, ultimately, survival of millions of Sudanese.

An improved policy may benefit American geo-political interests in the horn of Africa as well. The upcoming referendum in South Sudan could lead to the birth of a new African nation in a strategic location. It is unassailable that the United States and the government of South Sudan enjoy an amicable relationship, on military, economic and political platforms. So, a lot is at stake if the referendum is curtailed or rigged by Khartoum. The Sudanese regime can also prove intransigent in its peace talks with oppositions in Darfur and East Sudan if no carrots are in sight, let alone if more sticks are introduced. Looking outside the boundaries of Sudan, and recognizing the tension existing in the horn of Africa, the United States must not, and fortunately does not, underestimate the leverage Sudan has as the only other Muslim country in the Intergovernmental Authority on Development [IGAD]. Sudan, while boasting a stable relationship with the Somali government and the Islamic insurgency in Somalia, can play the role of mediator and conciliator. As a breeding ground for the Al-Qaeda-linked Al-Shabab militants, Somalia is a high priority on the agenda of the American-led war on terror. Sudan possesses a similar influence with the Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda, which frequently attacks South Sudanese territories and for which the Government of South Sudan allocatestime and money training local militia for counter-attacks. To ignore Sudan’s role can be arrogantly imprudent.The CIA learned this, and has acted on it for the past two decades.

One may label this argument as naive. What guarantees are there that Bashir will appreciate such carrots, and keep his end of the bargain? Allow me to respond with a different, often ignored, question. Granted, Bashir is a cunning and manipulative president,and the real victims of the economic sanctions levied by the United States are the Sudanese people. Why is it more plausible to believe that additional sanctions will force the Sudanese President to succumb to such intensified pressure? What if that pressure ignites an explosive reaction against the very citizens they so urgently strive to protect? On another note, shouldn't Sudan, as a country whose counterterrorism cooperation saved American lives, be rewarded?

JE

*This article appeared on World Policy Journal blog.

Obama's Game on Africa's Largest Turf

Having malaria and surviving an African plane crash would make a large number of Africans experts on the Sudan. Nicholas Kristof believes he is one such expert. In a recent column, he seemed unimpressed, if not unhappy, with Obama’s policy to prevent a third civil war in Sudan. Actually, Kristof has decided it’s already a “failure” since Obama’s administration is full of carrots mongers. I beg to differ with Mr. Kristof on that deterministic language. Only time can prove the failure or success of US policy in Sudan, formulated and carried by State Department officials and consultants; the experts on the Sudan.

I, however, agree with Kristof on one point with two mutually inclusive components. First, Bush administration did indeed play a big role in facilitating the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Government of the Sudan and SPLM/A, the warring parties in Sudan’s past two civil wars. Second, international players such as the UN, AU, Egypt, and even Norway, mustn‘t be ignored. On the contrary, they must be engaged, especially given their previous roles during the CPA negotiations preceding 2005.

In 2010, Kristof needs to cut Obama some slack. The situation in the Sudan is very different than what it was in 2005. Darfur is no longer a pressing case of genocide. Bashir has been indicted by the ICC on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity. The South has an autonomous status. Then why would applying a “sticks” policy, as Bush did, make any sense? Comparing Bush’s punitive strategy to Obama’s “unengaged” policy is comparing apples to “carrots.”

I believe Kristof would agree with me that the Sudanese regime is repressive and Bashir is a cunning and manipulative president. But believing that he will succumb to additional pressure is unfair to the Sudanese people, the real victims of the economic sanctions levied by the US. What if additional pressure ignites explosive reaction against the very people Kristof and I want to protect?

President Obama and his administration, as well as interested international players, are very cautious in their policies towards Bashir. It is 100 days before the Southerners will vote on their political future. My speculation is that after January 9^th, 2011 the world will witness a game of musical chairs on Sudan where the quickest and the most strategic player wins. I am no expert on Sudan, but I hope the Sudanese people win, and not Bashir.

JE

Non-Iraqi Solutions to Iraqi Problems

Political squabbling by elected representatives has destroyed the hopes of countless Iraqis, but in quantifiable terms, the number of Iraqi civilian casualties during this power struggle has already exceeded 1,500. Five months into the inconclusive parliamentary elections, Iraqi political blocs are still at a gridlock, with no majority consensus emerging. The nomination of a Prime Minister is similarly stymied. Disappointed with the status quo, international, regional and national stakeholders have begun beseeching foreign players to step in. But is it the most prudent path toward resolution?

This summer, President Obama wrote a letter to Grand Ayatollah Al-Sistani, Iraq’s top Shi’ite cleric, beseeching him to help his country’s politicians come to consensus. The ayatollah’s previous intercessions are recognized by Iraqi and American officials alike—particularly his role in defusing the Sadrist’s violent uprising against the U.S. forces in 2004. But appealing to a Shi’ite religious authority, albeit an Iraqi marjah [religious leader], in resolving a purely political problem involving both non-Shi’ite and secular elements, undermines this particular approach. Dr. Joseph Kechichian speculates that the marjah will remain aloof this time around just as he did during Bremer’s democratization efforts in 2004. As Al-Sistani's then said, "Mr. Bremer, you are American. I am Iranian. I suggest we leave it to Iraqis to devise their constitution.”

Numerous arguments have been made to underscore Al-Sistani’s politically shy personality as well as the low-key Shi'ite doctrine the ayatollah espouses, discouraging religious roles in politics. But taking these views at face-value is risky. Al-Sistani has made successful political demands for constitutional amendments and direct election of the provisional government. Additionally, Al-Sistani’s persistent indirect intervention may inadvertently flare-up dormant differences between religious sects. Recent reports circulating in Iraqi and the broader Arab media, while quoting anonymous sources, suggest that Moqtada Al-Sadr conveyed to Al-Sistani his support to Allawi, should the marjah back Al-Maliki’s bloc. Neither of them, however, has officially confirmed those reports.

While the United States sought intervention from the Shi'ite marjah, Iraqi politicians from major blocs engaged their Sunni neighbors, including Turkey. The diplomatic shuffle continues, beginning with Allawi’s visit to Ankara in May, Barzani’s trip in June and, most recently, Ali Al-Dabbagh of the State of Law Coalition and the current Iraqi government spokesperson and Ibrahim Al-Jaafari, the leader of the Islah Movement and a former prime minister. On their own initiative or by invitation, these officials and others are frequent visitors to Arabic capitals as well. It’s entirely possible to disavow the Sisyphean character of these visits while stressing the potential of regional mediation. But Iraq is not only multi-ethnic and multi-religious; it is also trans-sectarian. Therefore, its neighbors are on their toes for any future political arrangement that may have an impact across borders. Most important is the potential for a political resolution in Iraq that could empower ethnic or sectarian groups that are being suppressed within neighboring states. So long as Iraq's neighbors act rationally, they will not sacrifice their political interests for those of Iraq.

Nonetheless, diplomatic efforts are not confined to talks alone. In the past few weeks, American officials introduced a concrete scheme promising an equitable resolution of the current state of affairs between the major Iraqi blocs. According to the proposal, a power-sharing body, the Coordinating Council on National Strategic Policy (CCNSP), would substitute for the existing National Security Council. It’s expected that it would be led by Iyad Allawi, while Nouri Al-Maliki retains his premiership for the second term. However, it is unclear how this arrangement could be gratifying for Allawi, since the proposed Council is not intended to "change or disrupt the constitutional powers granted to the prime minister, the president or the speaker of the Parliament,” despite initial contention that its leader would serve as a new counterbalancing federal post to the prime minister. And although the devil is in the details, the proposed arrangement is, in its entirety, a precarious venture. First, it presents ad hoc measures as accepted procedures in resolving political deadlocks. Immobilization is a common recurrence in parliamentary systems. To allow contending parties to seek resolution through such channels undermines the role of the constitution as an impartial arbiter accepted and respected by all. Moreover, if ad hoc measures are deemed inevitable, as may be in the case in Iraq, where the new federal office aims at obtaining some of the constitutional powers granted to the prime minister to constrict any dictatorial ambitions the office may generate, the prudent approach must be applied. To devise these institutions and seek parliamentary approval to legislate them in the absence of a new national government is placing the cart before the horse.

Despite their differences in origin, attempts to bridge the gap between Iraqi political factions share two features. They originate abroad and offer sectarian solutions to political problems. The departure of American combat troops creates a turning point in Iraq’s history. At the same time, the fact that a secular political party achieved election success, even if wafer-thin, is crucial to guiding Iraq away from potential insurgent recidivism. Unless Iraqi politicians recognize the gravity of the situation and reconcile their differences for the greater good of the nation’s sovereignty, sectarian violence will shred the fabric of social cohesion Iraqis sought to weave in the recent parliamentary elections. This is not to ignore the influence Al-Sistani could provide in expediting talks, nor should we dismiss the negotiating capabilities of the United States and Iraq’s regional neighbors. Rather, it is essential to carefully draw the fine line that separates political mediation from political meddling. Meanwhile, Iraqis strive to survive increasing violence while living through scorching hot days with limited access to electricity and clean water. Even Ramadan did not seem to extinguish their frustration. On the contrary, it seemed to stoke it.

JE

*This article appeared on World Policy Institute and is the original piece from which a shorter piece on US most recent suggestions originated.

Obama, rethink your Iraq policy

In the coming years, US invasion and occupation, or if you prefer administration, of Iraq will be used as a peculiar case study of Western presence in the Middle East. The focus of such study will not be on the US policies during its troops’ actual presence on the ground, nor will it be on the policies surrounding its massive and sudden withdrawal seven years later. It will focus on the US post-withdrawal policies in resolving Iraq’s political logjam.

First, there is Obama’s letter to Grand Ayatollah Al-Sistani beseeching an intercession based on his role in diffusing previous political tensions in Iraq. But what the administration chose to ignore is Al-Sistani’s advice to Bremer during the Sadrist uprising in 2004, “Mr. Bremer, you are American. I am Iranian. I suggest we leave it to Iraqis to devise their constitution.” Then, there is also the US administration carefully planned schemes for equitable resolution of the gridlock by creating ad hoc political power-sharing body with some executive powers. With some American officials asserting their neutrality regarding who forms or runs the Iraqi government, while others explicitly stating their disfavor of having the Sadrist movement as a part of the coalition government, the scales will clearly tip in favor of the US undeterred pursuit of its interests in the region.

It is this particular resolution that highlights a clear strategic move at undermining Iraq’s external as well as internal sovereignty. If the administration prefers a certain sectarian arrangement within the Iraqi new government, it may enrage excluded groups and force them to take their rage onto the streets threatening further domestic destabilization. Externally, establishing an Iraqi government favorable to the US will strain Iraq’s relationship with its regional neighbors whose support it will be in dire need of in the future.

Politics aside, and more on a tactical note, this intervention is not only micro, but it is also irresponsible and untimely. Assenting to measures that supersede the Iraqi Constitution sets a precarious precedence. In a multi-ethnic, multi-sectarian state such as Iraq upholding ad hoc solutions at the first sectarian disagreement diminishes the sanctity of the Iraqi Constitution, itself drafted under the auspices of the US. Furthermore, in order to pass the legislation establishing this new political body, the Iraqi parliament needs to be called to duty and doing so, in the absence of a new national government six months after elections, is placing the cart before the horse.

Arguing all the above is not to disregard the influence Al-Sistani can render in expediting talks nor is it to dismiss the US obligation to fix its mess given the negotiating capabilities it possesses. It is to highlight the fine line that separates political mediation and political meddling. Obama’s administration gives US interests primacy, and that is rational, but let’s not forget it is also consequential. Enough harm has been done in Iraq. Now, it is time to seek Iraqi solutions to Iraqi problems.

JE

What is the inSIGnificant block?

Greetings,

the inSIGnificant block is a blog intended to reflect my personal thoughts and analyses of various political, economic and social issues in the Sudan, Iraq and the Gulf States; hence the capitalized portion of the title, inSIGnificant.

The idea behind this blog originated as a combination of a number of factors. Firstly, on a personal level, the Sudan and the Gulf States present great significance as places of residence where I spent more than half of my life. Secondly, in a different order, yet on an equal footing, the Gulf States, Iraq and the Sudan, are case studies to my academic thematic interests; particularly, political economy of the rentier states and governing systems of ethnically diverse countries. Thirdly, I found it to be indispensable to jot down my perspectives on the current developments in these three states/regions. Individually and collectively, the SIG, are at a turning point of their histories on national and regional levels and to allow my thoughts to wander off and vanish into thin air is a disservice to them as well as to my personal and academic prospects. Lastly, the insignificance of my blog as a title is not in any way attributed to the SIG as trivializing their peculiarity is irrational, if not altogether foolish, but rather descriptive of the status that this block (my blog) may assume in this ever-expanding blogosphere and the larger 3Ws. Often times, one stumbles upon remarkably thought-provoking posts, out of sheer randomness of quick tap on the touchpad, that only a handful have perused, and the majority of net-surfers had inadvertently, yet sadly, overlooked.

Thanks for stopping by.

JE